

BLOCKCHAIN: A REVIEW FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF OPERATIONS RESEARCHERS

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ABSTRACT

Blockchain is a distributed append-only digital ledger. The technology has caught much attention since the emergence of cryptocurrency, and there is an increasing number of blockchain applications in various businesses. The concept, however, is still novel to many members of the simulation and operations research community. In this tutorial, we introduce the blockchain technology and review its frontier related research. There are exciting opportunities for researchers in simulation, system analysis, and data science.

1 INTRODUCTION

Blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. As a distributed, secure record sharing system, blockchain is considered a revolution or the “future of the internet” by its believers; and a hoax by skeptics. In reality, blockchain technology does have a broad application in a wide variety of domains, but it is not a unanimous (better) solution for all systems.

Blockchain is, literally, a chain of blocks. The block here is composed of a certain amount of data, and the chain implies that the data are connected. More specifically, it is a consensus-based, peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed network with a growing list of blocks linked using cryptography. Each block contains an index (specifying the sequence of blocks), a timestamp (recording the approximate time that the block is added), the stored data, and the hashes of the current and previous blocks (Figure 1). Hash is the output of a




Figure 1: Blockchain demonstration.

cryptographic function converting a meaningful message into a non-meaningful, fixed-length alphanumeric string. The input of the hash function for block k includes the block components mentioned above, the stored data of the block k , and the hash of block $k - 1$. The hash value is highly sensitive to the input—a small change in input leads to a completely different output, which makes the function nonreversible. The hash function serves as the backbone of blockchain and will be discussed in more details in Section 3.

There are two essential properties of blockchain that distinguish it from the traditional centralized network. First, the data (in block) are immutable. Specifically, if a block is changed, all blocks after it will

become invalid since their previous block hashes will be void. Second, a distributed network with consensus allows users (with authorities) to communicate directly with each other to broadcast new blocks, synchronize the network status, and download the current database. The redundancy of the data and connection channels makes blockchain more tolerant of node failures. With these two properties, the longer the chain and more users (nodes) in the network, the harder it is to hack into the chain and change blocks without detection, making the blockchain more reliable (Nakamoto 2008). To understand the blockchain system better, we encourage the readers to explore an interactive demonstration of a blockchain at [Blockchain Demo](#).

The history of blockchain technology can be traced back to the year of 1991. Haber and Stornetta (1991) introduced a digital notary service to timestamp documents, which is regarded as the prototype of blockchain. Later, they brought their idea into effect by creating a timestamping service called Surety. They published their hash values in the New York Times once a week since 1995 to make it legitimate and unique. This service is considered to be the first blockchain in the world. Inspired by the work and along with concepts of Merkle tree (Merkle 1980), consensus and fault tolerance (Castro and Liskov 1999), and proof of work (Dwork and Naor 1993), Nakamoto (2008) developed the bitcoin project that is the most famous realization of the blockchain technology.

There have been numerous research on blockchain architectures, scalability, and novel consensus algorithms from computer and electrical scientists, and discussions of blockchain applications from various areas (mostly in finance and emerging in other regions). This tutorial has no intention to cover all of the state-of-art progress in this highly-interdisciplinary area. Our goal is to introduce the new technology to the simulation and operations research communities, review the relevant research, and initiate discussions of research opportunities in blockchain design, characterization, and application. We first describe four different kinds of blockchains with varying degrees of privacy, efficiency, and scalability that fit different scenarios in Section 2. Section 3 uses bitcoin and Ethereum to explain basic blockchain concepts, including mining, consensus, and smart contracts. Then in Section 4, we discuss a less famous but more widely used blockchain type, the consortium chain, and demonstrate its applications at the enterprise level. Section 5 reviews the current research of blockchain on simulation, game theory, and machine learning, focusing on system design and analysis of blockchain. We conclude the paper with discussions in Section 6, including the limitations of the blockchain and research opportunities for simulation and operations research communities.

2 BLOCKCHAIN MECHANISM DESIGN

In this section, we discuss the design of the blockchain mechanism, which is mainly characterized by the following three properties:

- Who can view the data in the system? If anyone can view and download a copy of the whole ledger, we call it a public chain; otherwise, it is a private chain.
- Who can validate the data and/or add a block? If anyone can initiate and validate transactions as well as generate and broadcast blocks, then it is permissionless, otherwise permissioned.
- How do participants achieve agreements or solve conflicts? This mechanism is called consensus. Proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) are most popular (Mingxiao et al. 2017).

The first two properties categorize different types of blockchains, which we introduced in Section 2.1. Moreover, we also discuss fundamental measurements of a blockchain system in the same section. The third property, the consensus, is decided based on the requirement of the specific application. Section 2.2 introduces two of the most popular consensus mechanisms with details.

2.1 Blockchain Types and Trade-off among Performance Measures

Note that a blockchain is public or private is independent of whether it is permissioned or not. As discussed in Chris Jaikaran's testimony to congress: "Discussing a blockchain as public or private refers to the level of freedom users have to create identities and read data on that blockchain. Discussing a blockchain

as permissioned or permissionless refers to the level of access the user would have on that blockchain.” (Jaikaran 2017). Table 1 classifies blockchains into four types based on these two independent properties.

Table 1: Comparison of different blockchain categories (+ represents desired properties, ~ represents neutral, and – represents shortcomings). (Parsons 2018)

<p>Public-Permissioned</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Good scaling ~ Private → Public ecosystem – Centralized + Independently verifiable – Not yet implemented 	<p>Private-Permissioned (Consortium)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Good scaling ~ Completely isolated ecosystem – Centralized – Not independently verifiable + Implemented by Hyperledger, etc.
<p>Public-Permissionless</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Poor scaling ~ Completely public ecosystem + Distributed + Independently verifiable + Implemented by bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. 	<p>Private-Permissionless</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Poor scaling ~ Private → Public ecosystem + Distributed – Not independently verifiable – Not yet implemented

Most of the cryptocurrencies use public and permissionless blockchains (Section 3). Private and permissioned (consortium) chains are widely used by individual enterprise and among collaborations of businesses. Customized platforms, such as Hyperledger Fabric by IBM (Linux Foundation 2020), have been developed to facilitate enterprise blockchain implementation (Section 4). Between the two ends of the spectrum, the private and permissionless chain limits who can access data, which fits for internal sharing and auditing data. The public and permissioned chain only allows a subset of users to validate the transactions and add blocks, which can be used in asset management like real estate and intellectual properties (Martin 2018). The later two categories are still in exploring stage.

There are three major and complementary measurements of blockchains: scalability, security, and decentralization. Here scalability refers to the network’s ability to handle growth, security to the attack-resistance, and decentralization to the degree of transparency, synchronization, and fairness among all nodes. Illustrated in Figure 2, the trade-off among these three is called the scalability trilemma, which means it is hard to maximize the other two without sacrificing the third. For example, in public and permissionless blockchains, all peers within maintain replicas of the full ledger, which enhances the system’s security and reliability. However, as the degree of decentralization increases (i.e., more peers involved), it will constrain the network’s throughput. Among the four categories, the public and permissionless chain has the most decentralized structure and assumes no trust among users. The private and permissioned chain, on the other hand, has the most centralized architecture and the highest level of trust among users and is widely used by individual enterprise and among collaborations of business. Table 1 summarizes the pros and cons of the four types of blockchains. The level of trust among users determines the optimal blockchain architecture and the consensus mechanism for each application.

2.2 Consensus Mechanism

The consensus is an algorithm to reach agreements among different nodes/participants of the distributed system to determine the ordering and confirmation of transactions. All distributed systems need to solve the Byzantine general problem (Lamport et al. 1982) to handle malicious behaviors that give false information. There have been many consensus developed since the invention of bitcoin. Most of them are either proof-of-work-based or proof-of-stake-based. PoW is the consensus applied by the majority of cryptocurrencies, including bitcoin. In this mechanism, the participants (i.e., miners) compete with each other to solve a complex computational puzzle that can only be done by brute-force search via a cryptographic hash function. This game is probabilistic, and the winning probability of a miner is proportional to her mining




Figure 2: Blockchain scalability trilemma (ReverseAcid 2018).

power. The winner will earn the right to add the next block and collect the transaction fees, as well as be rewarded a payoff (usually a certain amount of cryptocurrencies) by the system. Miners' workload safeguards the system with the price of energy waste. PoW is the first consensus developed for blockchain and is known for its fairness and safety. However, it is slow and expensive, and research shows that the mechanism can induce monopoly players that dominate the system. PoS is another widely used consensus that is complimentary to PoW. The next block is selected through a quasi-random process, whose probability depends on the stake held by a participant rather than its computation power. This mechanism is first applied by PPCoin (King, Sunny and Nadal, Scott 2012). PoS is much more efficient (both time and energy wise) than PoW. However, the PoS-based system suffers from a nothing-at-stake problem, in which a node without any stake may behave maliciously since she has nothing to lose.

Besides PoW and PoS, there have been many other consensus algorithms proposed recently for different trust level and system requirements (Mingxiao et al. 2017; Bamakan et al. 2020).

3 BITCOIN AND ETHEREUM: MINING AND SMART CONTRACT

This section introduces bitcoin and Ethereum systems, two of the most famous public-permissionless blockchain applications (Nakamoto, Satoshi 2008; Wood et al. 2014; Buterin, Vitalik 2014). These two platforms occupy more than 70% of the global mining power (Coinmarketcap 2020) and are suitable as examples to explain blockchain systems and terminologies. In Section 3.1, we elaborate on how bitcoin works and the mining process. Section 3.2 discusses Ethereum, which is a platform for digital currencies and also allows a wide variety of blockchain technology implementations through the smart contract. In fact, Ethereum users have applied smart contracts to create entire decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs).

3.1 Bitcoin and Mining Process

The most crucial difference between bitcoin (as well as other cryptocurrencies) and the traditional currency is that the former does not have an "issuer" (government or organizations) to endorse the value of the money, validate transactions, and regulate the financial system. Therefore the cryptocurrency must have (1) a security algorithm to protect each account so that other people cannot spend your money, and (2)

a self-regulation mechanism to maintain the system operation and avoid malicious behavior. For security concerns, bitcoin uses public key cryptography (or asymmetric cryptography) (Huh et al. 2017). There is no physical form of bitcoins, but records of transactions and balances for each account (node). Each account is associated with a public key and a private key, whose relationship is similar to that of an email address and password. The public key can be communicated in the network openly, and the private key allows the owner to access the fund. Mining is a unique mechanism that supports the daily operations of the bitcoin and most of the other cryptocurrencies' systems. Mining determines who can add a group of transactions, i.e., a new block to the current blockchain. When A wants to pay B one bitcoin, someone needs to validate that A 's account has sufficient funds, deduct one bitcoin from A 's account, and then add one bitcoin to B 's account. The transaction fee is the reward that A (or B) pays for the transaction recording. To create a valid block, a participant (miner) is required to (1) find a lucky number (nonce); (2) concatenate the nonce, the previous hash, and the list of transactions as the input string; and (3) apply the SHA-256 hash function to generate the hash of this whole input such that the 256-bit hash output falls in a target space that is quite small in relation to the much larger output space of the hash function. In this case, the nonce will have to satisfy the following inequality:

$$\text{Hash}(\text{nonce}||\text{previous block hash}||\text{txn}||\dots||\text{txn}) < \text{target}.$$

All miners compete to solve the above hash puzzle to achieve the PoW consensus in the bitcoin blockchain. The problem can only be solved by brute-force search. Therefore, each node's winning probability is proportional to their hashing power. Once a miner finds a required hash, she will broadcast her block to the whole network for validation. If the new block is validated by a majority of miners, the new block is formally appended to the blockchain and the block creator earns the reward (a certain amount of bitcoins) and transaction fees. See also (Narayanan et al. 2016) for details of the mining process.

The mining process is slow and energy-consuming. Each block takes about 10 minutes to generate (Nakamoto, Satoshi 2008; Subramanian, Vasani 2018), and the actual transaction validation can take much longer since each block contains only 1MB of data, and there are competitions among transactions. The higher the transaction fee offered, the quicker the transaction is likely to be handled. Moreover, based on a 2019 estimate by Vincent (2019), bitcoin mining consumes more energy than Switzerland, and the solved mathematical problem is not meaningful. However, this process is irreplaceable since the PoW is self-evident and can be agreed upon by all nodes without trust. Also, hacking a blockchain system requires significant computational powers. If these powers are used in mining, the expected rewards will be higher. Therefore it discourages cheating behaviors.

Compared with traditional currency, bitcoin is borderless, more transparent, and neutral. Moreover, the users have full control of their transactions. On the other hand, the disadvantage of bitcoin is its transaction speed, volatility, and narrow acceptance. The last one has been improved significantly in recent years.

3.2 Ethereum and Smart Contract

[Ethereum](#) is a decentralized open-source blockchain platform that features smart contracts. It provides a decentralized virtual machine that allows users to build their applications (i.e., dapps). The mined cryptocurrency is called Ether coin and is the second-largest digital currency by market cap after bitcoin. Ethereum is currently using PoW as its consensus protocol but transitioning into PoS. Validators replace miners, and they vote on which block will be added next to the chain. The more stakes (usually the cryptocurrency) a node has, the more voting power it will have. The node obtaining a larger number of coins has a more significant probability of creating a new block. The elimination of PoW mining significantly improves the efficiency of the blockchain but reduces its decentralization level.

Ethereum transactions include not only digital coins but also smart contracts. A smart contract is a piece of code that automatically executes certain activities when the condition is triggered. In application, the smart contract is uploaded to a node address, and other nodes can call a function of this smart contract to create a transaction. The transaction is irreversible, traceable, and transparent. Smart contracts are the building

elements of DAO, which are governed by a set of smart contracts without a centralized organization (Shermin 2017). As discussed by Voshmgir (2019), “Blockchain and smart contracts are governance technologies that have the potential to provide higher levels of transparency while reducing bureaucracy with self-enforcing code. They can minimize existing principal-agent dilemmas of organizations and subsequent moral hazards. Tokens of distributed networks hereby provide incentives to automatically align interests in the absence of third parties.” On the flip side, the smart contract and the DAO can introduce security risks to blockchain systems (Shermin 2017). For security analysis and research of the smart contract, see (Parizi et al. 2018; Watanabe et al. 2015; Sturm et al. 2019). Smart contracts based on blockchain technology have much potential in various industries. For example, one main problem in the supply chain is how to determine provenance. By translating the representations of ontology to smart contracts, Kim and Laskowski (2018) found they can execute a provenance trace on the Ethereum blockchain platform (Lu and Xu 2017; Galvez et al. 2018). Dolgui et al. (2020) developed and tested a new model for smart contract design in the supply chain with multiple logistics service providers and showed this problem can be presented as a multi-processor flexible flow shop scheduling. Gatteschi et al. (2018) discussed the possibility of applying blockchain and smart contracts in the insurance industry. Chang et al. (2019) designed a blockchain-based smart contract technology to facilitate international payment. For more discussions, see Section 4.

4 CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN

A typical consortium blockchain involves multiple entities and stakeholders, each with customized authorizations, such as validators and users (Liu et al. 2019). A consortium chain requires an invitation to join, and each node has highly customized authorities, allowing more control of the system by regulatory agencies. As a special case of consortium blockchain, the internal blockchain is a highly customized and cryptography-protected database maintained by a specific organization. Only the organization members could take part in the consensus process. The consortium blockchain infrastructure is especially useful for data sharing and document approval during collaborations among organizations. It offers better workflow, data transparency, activity traceability and visibility, and can predict and prevent nodes’ malicious behaviors (Manupati et al. 2020). Hyperledger is one of the most well-known umbrella projects of open-source consortium blockchains and tools developed by Linux, and customized frameworks and projects are developed under the umbrella (Linux Foundation 2022; Wang et al. 2020). Among them the most famous ones include Hyperledger Fabric (IBM) (Mao et al. 2018) and Sawtooth (Ampel et al. 2019)

Additionally, Tian (2016) proposed an agri-food supply chain traceability system using radio-frequency identification (RFID) and blockchain technology. Mao et al. (2018) designed a consortium blockchain to eliminate information asymmetry in the food trade, in order to establish a sustainable and credible trading environment. Manupati et al. (2020) developed a blockchain-based approach for monitoring supply chain performance and optimising both emission levels and operational costs in a synchronised fashion, yielding the optimal outcome for the sustainable supply chain. Moosavi et al. (2021) performed a systematic review to identify the contributions that blockchain technology made to supply chain management through bibliometric and network analysis. Jabbar et al. (2021) reviewed current use cases and startups in the field of blockchain-enabled supply chains and proposed MOHBSChain, a framework for blockchain-enabled supply chains MOHBSChain. Wang et al. (2021) describes how blockchain is deployed in complex multi-tier supply chain networks through a design science research (DSR) study of a smart contract initiative piloted by a consortium in the UK’s construction sector.

In pharmaceutical industry, for example, the consortium chain is used to fight counterfeit drugs by improving surveillance (Jamil et al. 2019; Tseng et al. 2018). Financial institutes use consortium chains to improve the efficiency of international trade (Chang et al. 2020). Healthcare organizations are enthusiastic in applying blockchain for healthcare data sharing and storage (Griggs et al. 2018; Zhang and Lin 2018). See also (Kang et al. 2017; Li et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2020) for applications in energy and construction areas. We expect to see more applications in the near future.

To summarize, combined with smart devices, consortium chains ensure transparent, traceable, and accountable data storage and sharing among end customers. The consortium chain, capable of highly secured and customized data sharing, has the potential to become the neural network of big data.

5 SYSTEM AND DATA ANALYSIS OF BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS

This section reviews the recent researches from system and data points of view. Our discussion is threefold: simulation characterization of blockchain systems (Section 5.1), game-theory approach to understand interactions among nodes (Section 5.2), and machine learning in and for blockchain (Section 5.3).

5.1 Simulation Study of Blockchain Systems

Recently, we see many simulation-related blockchain research appear. The current study mainly focuses on the mining behaviors of cryptocurrencies and the scalability of blockchain simulation models. Also, numerous simulators are proposed as platforms to evaluate the performance of blockchains under different conditions/attacks. Alharby and van Moorsel (2019) proposed an event-driven model with transactions and emphasized on the block creation through PoW. Aoki et al. (2019) involved events of block generation, block propagation, and message transmission/reception. Memon et al. (2019) built a queueing model to observe the realistic behaviors of both a memory and a mining pool for any blockchain system. To investigate the large-scale blockchain networks, Wang et al. (2018) collected and defined a number of metrics to quantify the quality of blockchain. Miller and Jansen (2015) enabled the scalable execution of thousands of bitcoin nodes on a single machine in their work and included the denial-of-service attack to demonstrate the proposed simulator. Gervais et al. (2016) studied optimal adversarial strategies for double-spending and selfish mining attacks based on Markov decision processes. They constructed a bitcoin simulator to analyze the security and performance of different configurations. Göbel et al. (2016) used discrete-event simulation to study the selfish-mining attack under a network with communication delay between miners. Foytik et al. (2020) presented a blockchain simulator that utilizes a generalized representation of consensus protocols, providing insights into the performance of the consensus protocols under various networking conditions. Varriale et al. (2021) conducted studies based on simulations to show the adoption of Internet of Things (IoT), RFID and blockchain in cheese supply chain has improvement in time performance for managing both perfect and non-compliant orders. Vangala et al. (2021) proposed a smart contract-based blockchain-envisioned authenticated key agreement mechanism in a smart farming environment and applied blockchain-based simulation to measure computational time for a varied number of both blocks and transactions per block.

Agent-based simulation is a powerful tool to study the blockchain, especially for modeling the interactions among agents. Kaligotla and Macal (2018) provided a generalized framework of modeling blockchain simulation by illustrating the essential agents and functioning of the system. Cocco and Marchesi (2016) reproduced the economy of the mining process with heterogeneous agents by including the bitcoin transactions and price series. Rosa et al. (2019) developed a security attack testing platform by exploiting parallel and distributed simulation techniques with extended scalability. Intimated by the design of algorithmic trading and reinforcement learning systems, Chitra et al. (2019) proposed an agent-based simulation to model censorship properties in parallelized PoW chains. Their results illustrated how endogenous design choices affect practical protocol performance and how simulations can interact with exogenous data. Brousmiche et al. (2018) built an agent-based framework for simulating local energy market place integrating realistic consumption/production behavior and interacting with a private blockchain network. Bottone et al. (2018) developed an extendable multi-agent simulator for a block-free and fee-less distributed ledger, in which they employed NetLogo to provide a 3D visualization of the Tangle (Popov 2016).

Besides the above simulation-focused research, there are also more and more blockchain-related research that use simulation as important analysis tool. Goswami (2017) discussed the factors that limit the scalability of blockchains by providing a comparative analysis of several blockchain parameters with real-time data.

Alsahan et al. (2020) adopted the lightweight virtualization technique for constructing a simulation model with high speed and large scalability. The impact of applying different mining difficulty levels was also studied, and the block time as well as fork occurrences were evaluated. Yasaweerasinghelage et al. (2017) used architectural modeling and simulation to measure the latency in blockchain systems under different configurations. Longo et al. (2019) developed a hybrid (discrete-event and agent-based) supply chain simulation model to recreate the supply chain operations, which was integrated by an Ethereum-like blockchain with different visibility levels through the same software connector.

A two-layer simulation model. We propose a Monte-Carlo discrete-event simulation model of bitcoin mining with two layers: first, individual miners make decisions on how to mine and which pool to join (Figure 3); second, mining pool managers manage pools by membership fee adjustment and mining reward




Figure 3: An illustration of the two-layer miner and mining pool decision model.

allocation (Li et al. 2021). The simulation model is designed to be realistic by providing comprehensive functionalities, e.g., share submission, mining rate, pool membership fee, pool reward allocation, adaptive mining difficulty, etc. In the first layer of individual miners, two mining policies, i.e., (i) a “default” policy with the decision stage and the execution stage and (ii) an alternative policy according to the relationship between the overall hashing rate and difficulty level, are tested; a soft/random pool hopping policy is provided regarding pool selection, which is based on the utilities through prospect theory. In the second layer of mining pools, the membership fee is updated periodically to control the mining power possessed by each pool; moreover, factors related to the monopoly of the bitcoin mining system are also studied.

5.2 Game Theory

As a powerful tool for strategic decision-making, game theory plays a valuable role in the blockchain field. It optimizes the utility of each player while considering the interactions with others. Of the increasing amount of research in studying blockchain with game theory, The non-cooperative game represents the situation where players compete against each other. Eyal (2015) proposed the miner’s dilemma for potential attack to the system. Teutsch et al. (2016) used non-cooperative theory for fork chain selection of bitcoin. Liao and Katz (2017) modeled the interaction between attackers and regular miners in a whale attack. The condition when a miner has an incentive to mine on the fork was investigated by Kroll et al. (2013). Dimitri (2017) characterized the mining activity as an all-pay contest to study the mining computational power allocation. To investigate when gaps (the situation that miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient) form, Tsabary and Eyal (2018) analyzed the cryptocurrency system via the gap game. Easley et al. (2019) developed a game-theoretic model to explain the factors leading to the emergence of transaction fees and the strategic behavior of miners and users. Pagnotta, Emiliano and Buraschi, Andrea (2018) showed the equilibrium price is obtained by solving a fixed-point problem. The non-cooperative theory can also be used for pool selection regarding the mining rewards allocation (Schrijvers et al. 2017).

The other game forms that have been applied to model the blockchain system. Extensive-form games describe dynamic games with a decision tree structure (the normal game use matrix instead). See (Dong

et al. 2017; Lewenberg et al. 2015; Cong et al. 2021; Cong et al. 2021; Zhang et al. 2021; Gao et al. 2022; Lohr et al. 2022). In the Stackelberg game, there are two types of players: leaders and followers. The leader moves first and then the followers will make decisions based on the leader's movement. This game form is especially useful for studying the interactions between blockchain designers and users. See (Kang et al. 2018; Feng et al. 2021; Xiong et al. 2018). The stochastic game assumes that there are one or more players make decisions repeatedly with probabilistic transitions. See (Zhen et al. 2017; Kroll et al. 2013; Kim 2019; Biais et al. 2019; Li et al. 2017). Our research group proposes a fluid mean-field model, which we discuss below.

We study the stochastic dynamic game of mining bitcoins (i) by the *fluid* model capturing many opportunities and (ii) the *mean-field* concept approximating the large-scale system. Consider a single miner with positive b and p as mining monetary budget and power capacity, respectively, we formulate the following problem to maximize the expected total utility during the planning horizon $[0, d]$:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{H(\cdot)} d\mathbb{E}_V[\mu V \cdot w(H(V)) - c(H(V))], \\ & \text{subject to } d\mathbb{E}_V[c(H(V))] \leq b, \\ & 0 \leq H(V) \leq p, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where μ is the exogenous constant block generation rate, V is the random valuation on successfully mining a new valid block, $H(\cdot)$ is the hashing policy function, $c(\cdot)$ is the cost rate function, and $w(h) := \mathbb{E}_M \left[\frac{h}{h+M} \right]$ is the expected individual winning probability when investing hashing power $h \in [0, p]$. The total rate of all other competitors M is assumed to be a stationary random variable over time by following the mean-field concept: in a highly competitive dynamic game, instead of tracking each competitor in real time, which will be averaged out due to the large-scale system, it is enough to observe the stationary distribution characterizing the population state to make the best response. Additionally, by applying the fluid approximation to the mining budget constraint, we only require the cumulative mining expenditure cannot exceed the assigned budget b in expectation (see the first constraint of problem (1)). By solving the above problem, we obtain the fluid-based optimal hashing policy $H^*(\cdot)$, which is indeed a function of the block valuation.

Given a non-negative random variable M , the new stationary total competing rate is computed by summing up all fluid-based individual rates, i.e., $\widehat{M}(M) := \sum_{k=1}^{\widehat{Q}} H_k^*(V_k; M)$, where \widehat{Q} is the number of competing miner in steady state and $H_k^*(\cdot; M)$ is the policy solving (1) independently for the k^{th} miner by emphasizing the dependence on M . We successfully find that there exist at least one equilibrated total competing rate M_e such that $\widehat{M}(M_e)$ has the same distribution with M_e . We also conducted extensive numerical evaluations and gain interesting insights. The related results are from an unpublished paper we are working on. The fluid mean-field model could be extended by considering endogenous block generation rate, large players with significant mining power (e.g., mining pools), etc., through computational game theory and simulation optimization approach, which we are exploring now.

5.3 Machine Learning in and for Blockchain

Machine learning refers to the science of teaching the computer system to predict based on data without explicit programming. Its efficacy relies heavily on the quantity and quality of data. Blockchain technology has attracted data scientists' attention since it allows highly customized data sharing without relying on a trusted third party. On the other hand, machine learning algorithms are powerful tools for analyzing and optimizing blockchain operations. The combination of the two technologies can be a game-changer.

Data privacy becomes a critical issue in the current digitalized society, especially for sensitive data sharing in healthcare and finance. Blockchain framework keeps the data safe through cryptography, and allows individual users, instead of a third party, to have full control of their shared data. Some examples of blockchain-based machine learning frameworks are demonstrated by Harris and Waggoner (2019), Chen

et al. (2018), Zhu et al. (2018), and Liu et al. (2018). For application, see (Dibaei et al. 2022) (database), (Shah et al. 2021) (education), and (Kumar et al. 2021) (IoT). We expect more blockchain-based data sharing platforms to emerge in the future. Machine learning methods prove to be efficient in categorizing bitcoin transactions and predicting its price (Yin and Vatrappu 2017; Akcora et al. 2020; Jourdan et al. 2019; Akcora et al. 2018; Abay et al. 2019; McNally et al. 2018; Lahmiri and Bekiros 2019).

Furthermore, researchers are exploring the possibilities of applying machine learning technique to solve computing resource optimization problem in edge and cloud distributed computing using deep learning based auction algorithm (Luong et al. 2018) and reinforcement learning (Nguyen et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2019). Capital allocation can also be solved by machine learning to construct portfolios of cryptocurrencies (Alessandretti et al. 2018; Jiang and Liang 2017).

A closer look at the studies of incorporating machine learning with blockchain technology, however, reveals some shortcomings. The current research mostly focuses on the financial sector, specifically, bitcoin mining and trading. In combining blockchain with data science, the current research is simply the application of one technology to another. The benefit of using the blockchain is unclear. The papers mainly focus on using blockchain for data sharing, ignoring its property of improved safety and the higher cost of cheating.

6 DISCUSSIONS

In this tutorial, we introduced the concept of blockchain, its categories, its applications, and current research in the simulation area. In this section, we want to discuss the challenges of blockchain application and how we, researchers in simulation and operations research society, can contribute.

Foremost, blockchain is not a universal (better) solution for all scenarios. It has many disadvantages compared to the traditional centralized system. First, the mining processes for PoW-based cryptocurrencies are slow and energy-intensive. Meanwhile, blockchain's decentralized architecture requires duplication of computations and expenditure of efforts for transaction confirmation. All of these lead to slow transaction speed (Huberman et al. 2021). Currently, the bitcoin blockchain can guarantee only 4.6 transactions per second (TPS), and Ethereum with an average of 12 TPS. For Visa, on the other hand, the value is around 24,000 TPS (Strelenko 2018). The slow transaction speed is the biggest bottleneck of cryptocurrency. Similarly, blockchain-based data sharing is slower than a traditional centralized database. Moreover, the blockchain's safety will be compromised if attackers could possess the majority (more than 50%) of hashing power in the system, which means small-size blockchains are not safe. Finally, the blockchain can only identify the intent to change data but cannot prevent initial data forging.

So when should blockchain be applied? For traditional (public-permissionless) blockchains, the answer is almost no cases except for cryptocurrency. For private and consortium chains, if a centralized or distributed conventional database works and you can rely on a trusted third party, you do not need blockchain. The consortium chain should be considered when there is no or only partial trust toward a third party and/or each other, or for data validation, audition, and public monitoring purposes.

While research by computer scientists has made significant progress on blockchain consensus, architecture, and scalability, characterizing the blockchain as a complex system is still in an early stage. Sophisticated mathematical and simulation models are needed to capture individual nodes' behaviors and their interactions, as well as the system's evolution under different environments. Moreover, in current studies, nodes/agents all follow simple rules with almost no learning ability. Game theory can shed light on optimal individual decision-making, incentive design, and system equilibriums (or lack of them). The current game theory study is limited and constrained. We expect the computational game theory approach incorporating simulation and other numerical models to be an active research area. Thirdly, blockchain cannot be apart from data. The current data-related blockchain research is at the pioneer stage and is usually just a direct application of one technology to another. A highly integrated infrastructure that combines data science and blockchain technology has great potential.

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